Von der Leyen’s State of the Union address on 16 September will test whether the EU can translate ambition into action amid defence pressures and technological dependency
In two days, Ursula von der Leyen will stand before the European Parliament to deliver her annual State of the Union address. The Commission President has spent months laying groundwork for what amounts to a reckoning with European fragility—a moment when the Union must confront the gap between its growing ambitions and its capacity to act. The September 16 speech will not resolve that tension, but it will signal whether Brussels intends to close it.
The themes are already visible in the Commission’s preparatory statements. Defence readiness, technological sovereignty, economic competitiveness, and climate resilience will dominate the agenda. What makes this address different from previous State of the Union speeches is not the menu of priorities—the EU has rehearsed these problems for years—but the urgency with which the Commission now frames them. This is not a future challenge. It is presented as an immediate test of whether Europe can survive as an independent actor in a world reshaped by power politics.
The geopolitical context is unambiguous. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine has forced the EU to commit unprecedented sums to defence and military support. Earlier this year, EU member states agreed to provide an additional €90 billion in support for Ukraine’s budget and military needs across 2026 and 2027, layered on top of more than €200 billion already deployed since 2022. This is not marginal expenditure. It represents a reorientation of European priorities that would have seemed inconceivable five years ago. Yet alongside this commitment runs a deeper anxiety: the knowledge that sustained support for Ukraine depends on European industrial capacity, technological resilience, and political will all remaining aligned. Any one of these fractures, and the entire edifice becomes uncertain.
The defence dimension will consume much of von der Leyen’s attention. The European Defence Industry Programme, adopted earlier this year with a budget of €1.5 billion for 2026 and 2027, has begun funding production expansions across the continent. Ammunition manufacturing capacity has increased by 40 percent. The Commission and Ukraine signed a new defence industrial partnership in July aimed at scaling joint production of drones by the end of this year and anti-ballistic missiles by 2028. Some 95,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been trained through EU military assistance initiatives. On paper, the Union is mobilising its industrial base at a pace not seen since the Cold War.
Yet significant obstacles remain unresolved. The European defence industrial base remains fragmented. Despite these recent investments, Europe continues to rely on non-European suppliers for critical components—advanced semiconductors, satellite systems, certain missile technologies—that modern warfare demands. The dependency on American defence technology, from intelligence gathering to air defence systems, remains substantial. Von der Leyen will likely reaffirm the Union’s commitment to Ukraine and highlight the capacity increases already underway. What remains unclear is whether she will address the structural fragmentation that prevents the EU from mobilising its full industrial potential. Member states have historically preferred national defence champions to coordinated European procurement. The Commission has tried to incentivise joint purchasing, but the shift in behaviour has been glacial.
If defence captures the immediate attention, technological sovereignty will define the longer argument. In June, the European Commission released what it framed as a fundamental reorientation of EU technology strategy. The Technological Sovereignty Package comprised four interconnected measures: the Chips Act 2.0, the Cloud and AI Development Act, a new EU Open Source Strategy, and a strategic roadmap for digitalisation and AI in energy systems. The Commission’s diagnosis, borrowed heavily from Mario Draghi’s competitive report, was blunt: Europe depends on non-EU countries for over eighty percent of key digital products, services, infrastructure, and intellectual property. This dependency is not a market inefficiency. It is a strategic vulnerability that can be weaponised.
The remedies proposed are ambitious but face real constraints. The EU launched a call for AI Gigafactories in July, with the promise to unlock more than €30 billion in investment for computing capacity. The Cloud and AI Development Act, expected to be presented in full early next year, aims to address the lack of competitive European cloud infrastructure and reduce dependency on US platforms. Yet these initiatives collide with a structural problem that regulation alone cannot solve: energy costs. Europe’s electricity remains substantially more expensive than in the United States or Asia. The same industrial capacity that Europe needs to build sovereign AI infrastructure operates at a competitive disadvantage from the outset.
Von der Leyen has been clear that technology sovereignty is not optional. She will likely use the State of the Union to announce either the full Cloud and AI Development Act or at minimum detailed expectations for its structure. She may outline additional funding mechanisms for semiconductor manufacturing. She will certainly reaffirm the Commission’s commitment to reducing strategic dependencies. The harder questions—how to make European technology offerings attractive without protectionism, how to fund the energy infrastructure that industrial capacity requires, how to coordinate across member states without invoking accusations of centralised control—will receive less direct treatment. These questions do not lend themselves to the rhetorical gravity that State of the Union speeches demand.
Economic competitiveness underpins both the defence and technology agendas. The Commission has spent 2026 emphasising that Europe’s industrial revival depends on structural economic change. That means workforce development, particularly in STEM fields. It means attracting global talent through reformed legal migration pathways—the Commission launched a European Legal Gateway Office in early 2026 as a pilot for attracting ICT professionals from outside the EU. It means unblocking investment in critical infrastructure. It means, in some cases, accepting that the old regulatory frameworks that made Europe attractive to European firms now make it difficult for European firms to compete globally.
Here the State of the Union will likely reveal tensions that have been building throughout 2026. The Commission has committed to a new regulatory simplification agenda. Yet the same Commission has been introducing additional layers of regulation—the AI Act entered enforcement phase in August, new rules on critical infrastructure, new standards for digital services. Industry has complained, with justification, that Europe continues to regulate for a world of perfect information and homogeneous risk when global competition rewards speed and asymmetric advantage. Von der Leyen faces a real choice: either signal a genuine shift in regulatory philosophy or acknowledge that competitiveness improvements will remain incremental rather than transformative.
The credibility question animates all of this. Von der Leyen has spent 2026 calling for a new European independence. She has invoked the phrase across multiple speeches and institutional contexts. In Davos in January, she positioned European independence as a structural imperative, not a temporary reaction to geopolitical shocks. At the Ambassadors Conference, she urged a more assertive European foreign policy. The Commission’s work programme adopted in October 2025 was titled “Europe’s Independence Moment.” The message has been consistent: geopolitical change is permanent, Europe must act accordingly, and the window for action is narrowing.
But between the rhetoric and the reality lies the familiar gap. The Commission can propose legislation. It cannot force member states to implement it at pace. It can allocate funding. It cannot compel coordinated industrial policy across twenty-seven countries with different strategic priorities and economic structures. It can call for common defence procurement. It cannot override national sovereignty in security matters. The September 16 address will demonstrate whether von der Leyen intends to acknowledge these constraints or whether she will continue to emphasise ambition at the expense of realistic assessment of what the EU can actually achieve.
What the State of the Union will likely deliver is a recalibrated understanding of European priorities for the year ahead. Defence will remain at the centre. Technology sovereignty will command sustained attention, particularly around the April release of the Cloud and AI Development Act. Economic competitiveness will be framed less as a regulatory problem and more as a capacity and workforce problem—which at least locates responsibility more clearly with member states. Democracy and rule of law will receive rhetorical emphasis, though the substantive content is likely to be less detailed than in previous years.
The real test will come after September 16. A compelling State of the Union address is merely the opening gambit. What matters is whether the Commission can maintain political momentum across the Parliament and the member states; whether the Commission can shepherd complex legislation through the co-legislative process without major dilution; whether the Council can reach consensus on coordinated defence procurement and industrial policy despite the national interests pulling in different directions. These tests extend across the entire year ahead.
Von der Leyen is not naive about these challenges. Her messaging throughout 2026 has been unusually alert to the gap between European ambition and European capacity. The question is whether she will use the State of the Union to close that gap or widen it through rhetoric that outpaces realistic possibility. A successful address will set a credible agenda for the months ahead while acknowledging the real constraints within which that agenda must operate. A rhetorical flourish that promises more than the Union can deliver will simply deepen the credibility crisis already present in European institutions.
For now, the countdown continues. When von der Leyen takes the floor on September 16, she will be addressing not just the European Parliament but the wider question of whether European institutions can translate the diagnosis of fragility into genuine structural change. The answer matters. It will shape not just European policy for the next year, but perceptions of European capacity to act for years beyond that.
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