Foreign fighters are often treated as a single phenomenon. They are not. Russia, Israel and Iran mobilise outsiders through fundamentally different systems — labour, identity and ideology. And as today’s wars stretch on, practices once seen as exceptional are becoming easier to justify, easier to hide and, in some cases, dangerously close to normal.
Why Do Different Wars Use Foreign Fighters So Differently?
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed a striking pattern. African men were recruited through what looked like security or factory jobs, only to find themselves deployed to the front, according to The Guardian. The question is not only how this happened, but why wars diverge so sharply in how they mobilise people across borders.
Russia: When War Starts to Resemble a Labour Market
Reports from Kenya and other African states describe recruitment channels that look less like military enlistment and more like labour brokerage. Some men signed contracts for security or industrial work. Many were later deployed under military command.
El País estimates that nearly 2,000 African fighters are now serving in Russian units. Analysts describe this as a form of “military trafficking” — a system where economic vulnerability meets wartime demand.
The structure is clear enough: war as a labour market, shaped by a long conflict, manpower shortages and the political cost of mobilising citizens at home.
Israel: A Diaspora-Based Model of Belonging
Israel’s foreign volunteers come through a very different channel. The IDF’s Lone Soldier Program offers a formal path for diaspora Jews who choose to serve. Participation is voluntary, structured and tied to identity rather than economic need.
Media like BBC and NYT reports note an increase in overseas volunteers during periods of heightened conflict. The logic here is not transactional. It is about belonging — war as identity.
Iran: Ideology and Transnational Networks
Iran’s mobilisation model sits somewhere else again. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has long recruited fighters from Shia communities abroad, including the Fatemiyoun Division and Zaynabiyoun Brigade. These units operate in conflicts such as Syria, drawing on religious networks and political alignment.
Brookings describes them as “Shia foreign legions,” supported by a mix of ideology, community ties and state-linked structures. The International Crisis Group notes that these networks blur the line between state and non‑state mobilisation.
This is war as ideological mobilisation, sustained by transnational identity rather than wages.
Three Models, Three Logics — And Very Different Outcomes
The contrasts are stark:
- Russia draws on economic vulnerability and opaque recruitment.
- Israel relies on diaspora identity and formal volunteer pathways.
- Iran mobilises through religious and political networks.
These are not variations of the same phenomenon. They reflect three different systems of mobilisation, shaped by the structure and duration of each conflict.
Why Russia’s Model Stands Apart
Analysts point to several factors:
- A long war that continually requires new personnel
- High domestic political costs for large‑scale mobilisation
- A view of foreign recruits as replaceable labour rather than national volunteers
This combination pushes recruitment toward the global labour market, where economic need meets wartime demand.
The Longer a War Lasts, the More It Redraws the Boundaries of What Societies Accept
Long wars do something short wars rarely do: they change the moral weather. At the beginning of a conflict, governments face scrutiny, the public pays attention, and the line between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour is still relatively firm.
But as months turn into years, visibility drops. International attention scatters. Domestic politics adapts. And practices that once looked extraordinary begin to feel — or at least appear — routine.
Foreign recruitment sits squarely in this grey zone. It becomes easier to justify when a conflict drags on, not because the ethics improve, but because the urgency does. States look for manpower wherever it can be found. Intermediaries step into the gaps. And the distinction between a soldier, a volunteer and a worker becomes harder to maintain.
The issue is not only that foreign fighters are being mobilised. It is that prolonged conflict creates the conditions in which such mobilisation becomes thinkable, then tolerable, and eventually normalised.
Some analysts argue that this is the real structural shift of modern warfare: long wars do not just consume resources — they reshape the boundaries of mobilisation itself.
A Structural Change in How Wars Mobilise People
Modern warfare is no longer defined only by states and armies. It is shaped by how societies mobilise across borders — as workers, as believers, or as volunteers.
Some fight because they believe. Others because they belong. And some, increasingly, because they were hired — or thought they were.
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